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Yes Prime Minister! 
 
Dirk Voorhoof and Rónán Ó Fathaigh 
 
In the case of Tuşalp v. Turkey, the European Court was asked to consider whether two 
defamation actions taken by the Prime Minister of Turkey against a journalist for protection of 
his personality rights were compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention.  
 
The applicant was Erbil Tuşalp, a journalist and author, who had published two articles in the 
Birgün newspaper concerning alleged illegal conduct and corruption in Turkish public life. The 
articles severely criticised the Prime Minister, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, including such 
statements as “From teachers to judges ... the man uses these posts like the property of his own 
party”, and “I consider it useful for both his and the public’s mental health to investigate whether 
he had a high-fevered illness when he was young ... I suspect he is suffering from a psychopathic 
aggressive illness. I wish him quick recovery”.     
 
The Prime Minister brought civil proceedings against the applicant and the publishing company 
on the ground that certain remarks in the articles constituted an attack on his personality rights. 
The Turkish courts considered that the remarks went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism 
and “belittled the Prime Minister in the public and the political arena”. According to the 
domestic courts, the applicant had published “allegations of a kind one cannot make of a Prime 
Minister”, holding that the impugned remarks had alleged that the Prime Minister had 
psychological problems and was mentally ill. The applicant and publishing company were 
ordered to pay 10,000 Turkish liras (€4,300) in compensation.      
 
The European Court of Human Rights however disagreed with the findings of the Turkish courts. 
The Court considered that the articles concerned the applicant’s comments and views on current 
events, and were very important matters in a democratic society which the public had an interest 
in being informed about and fell within the scope of political debate.    
 
The Court also considered the balance between the applicant’s interest in conveying his views, 
and the Prime Minister’s interests in having his reputation protected and being protected against 
personal insult. In this regard, the Court held that even assuming that the expressions used in the 
articles could be classed as provocative, inelegant, and offensive, they were mostly value 
judgments, and had a sufficient factual basis.  
 
In an important passage, the Court held as a matter of principle that offensive language may fall 
outside the protection of freedom of expression if it amounts to “wanton denigration”, where the 
sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult (citing Skałka v. Poland, para. 34). However, 
the Court added that the use of vulgar phrases in itself is not decisive in the assessment of 
offensive expression as it may well serve merely stylistic purposes, as “style constitutes part of 
communication as a form of expression and is as such protected together with the content of the 
expression”.   
  
The European Court held that the Turkish courts had not set the impugned remarks within the 
context and the form in which they were conveyed, with the European Court holding that the 
strong remarks in the articles could not be construed as a gratuitous personal attack on the Prime 
Minister. The Court concluded that the Turkish courts had failed to establish any “pressing social 
need” for putting the Prime Minister’s personality rights above the right to freedom of expression 
and the general interest in promoting press freedom. There had thus been a violation of Article 
10. 
 
Comment  
 
The Tuşalp judgment continues a strong tradition in European Court jurisprudence where 
freedom of expression prevails in cases of insult or defamation of heads of state, presidents or 
high ranking politicians (for example, Lingens v. Austria, Oberschlick (no. 2) v. Austria, Feldek 
v. Slovakia, Colombani a.o. v. France, Wille v. Liechtenstein, Radio Twist AS v. Slovakia, 
Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, Sokolowski v. Poland, Gutiérrez Suárez v. Spain, Karakó 
v. Hungary and Otegi Mondragon v. Spain). 
 
Moreover, the Court has also shown its willingness to hold that freedom of expression may be 
legitimately restricted where statements concerning public figures may stir up violence (see 
Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July  v. France, defamation of Jean Marie le Pen), where 
there has been an illegitimate intrusion into private life (see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria 
(no. 2), privacy of President and his wife), or where there is a clear lack of a factual basis (see 
Alithia Publishing Co. Ltd. and Constantinides v. Cyprus, serious allegations against former 
Minister of Defence, without a  sufficient factual basis). 
 
The most interesting aspect of the Tuşalp judgment relates to the statements of principle 
concerning “satirical style”, and offensive expression. The Court in Tuşalp held that offensive 
expression may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression only if it amounts to 
“wanton denigration”, such as where the sole intent is to insult (citing Skałka v. Poland). This 
idea of “wanton denigration” is a new caveat to determining whether certain expression is not 
protected by Article 10 and notably, this qualification was not mentioned Skałka nor in a 
previous Grand Chamber judgment in Palomo Sánchez a.o. v. Spain when discussing offensive 
expression. 
 
Moreover, the Court in Tuşalp further held that the use of vulgar phrases in itself is not decisive 
in the assessment of whether expression is offensive, as it may well serve “stylistic purposes”, as 
style constitutes part of communication and is protected under Article 10. This continues the 
trend evidenced in judgments such as Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, where highly 
offensive expression is protected due to its satirical and political nature (see also Alinak v. 
Turkey, Klein v. Slovakia, Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, Bodrožić and 
Vuijn v. Serbia and Alves Da Silva v. Portugal). 
 
Although the Court does not provide any authority for its propositions regarding the principles 
for determining whether an expression is offensive, and for expressive “style” being protected by 
Article 10, the principles are in fact taken from a recent Second Section judgment in Uj v. 
Hungary, which concerned a libel action following the characterisation of a wine produced by a 
national State-owned corporation as “shit”. It would seem that the Court in Tuşalp is building 
upon the Uj judgment, and broadening the breathing space for borderline critical / insulting 
expression discussing or commenting on matters of public interest or as part of political debate. 
 
Finally, this judgment must be placed in the broader context of the worrying series of violations 
of Article 10 by Turkey, now symbolised by the Turkish Prime Minister successfully taking 
defamation proceedings against a journalist to curtail press criticism, with the Turkish courts 
again blatantly failing to apply the Court’s case law on criticising political figures (see 
Committee of Ministers’ Resolution (2008) here, and the Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
Report (2011) here). It is to be hoped that judgments such as Tuşalp will provide sufficient 
guidance to the Turkish courts on adequate application of Article 10 principles, with a 
consequent strengthening of press freedom in Turkey. In the most recent ranking by Reporters 
Without Borders Turkey is at number 148, in the neighbourhood of Russia, Philippines, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Uzbekistan and Saudi 
Arabia. A very awkward situation for a country that has been a member for 60 years of the 
Council of Europe and of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
  
(The title of this blog refers to the famous BBC comedy series Yes (Prime) Minister (YPM): 
http://www.yes-minister.com/introduc.htm) 
